Die Wahrheit liegt weder in der unendlichen Annährung an einer objektiv Gegebenes noch in der Mitte, sondern rundherum wie ein Sack, der mit jeder neuen Meinung, die man hineinstopft, seine Form ändert, aber immer fester wird.
Introduction
These remarks examine the possibilities for representing the various commonly proposed solutions to the paradox of the liar, as games between players. We are dealing here with semantical solutions or approaches to those paradoxes. The most well known of those is due to Kripke [10] . In that paper he suggested building up values to a partially defined truth predicate, using (amongst other suggested methods) the three valued Strong Kleene truth tables. The monotonicity of the procedure implied that starting from the empty set the least fixed point set could be built up as an extension of the partially defined truth predicate, interpreted over some countable model M. Thus, if we let the language of the model L = L M , we may extend it to the language L + by adding a predicate symbolṪ which is then partially interpreted as T = (T + , T − ), yielding an extension T + of true sentences and a so-called anti-extension T − of false sentences. We then give, iteratively, successive progressive extensions T α = (T +, α , T − α ) each containing all previous ones. A fixed point T ∞ = (T + ∞ , T − ∞ ) must then be reached when no further applications of the truth table rules add any further sentences of the language L + to the extension or anti-extension. (See Burgess [1] or the monograph of McGee [12] for a complete description.) This monotone operation results in inductively complete inductive sets of sentences via the use of any of the Kleene schemes and of (variations on) the supervaluation jump operator when starting with the standard model of the natural numbers N as M.
At a similar period to Kripke, Hans Herzberger produced in [6] , [7] a construction for studying the behaviour of diagonal liar, or liar like, sentences that involved a totally interpreted truth predicateṪ, but where the iterative stages did not build up any truth set in an accumulative fashion. but revised the extension at stage T α into a new extension at T α+1 . The intention was to provide a tool for the analysis of sentence behaviour along such a sequence of revisions. (Herzberger explained that he was not thinking of providing a full-blown theory of truth with these mechanisms.) We might then start with an 'empty' or null assignment to the predicate at the initial stage T 0 = ∅, corresponding in fact to assigning false to all sentences of L + , 'iterate' by applying the standard Tarskian truths, and obtaining a sequence of predicates in this fashion. The procedure was supposed to be carried through at limit stages by using a truth-parsimonious 'liminf' rule where by for limit ordinals λ:
T λ = Liminf α→λ T α = df β<λ β<α<λ T α . One may try to understand these processes through different means. One may try and axiomatise a theory dealing with a truth predicate to attempt to capture the semantic intention. The theory KF of Feferman is an axiomatisation of Kripke's strong Kleenean scheme. (See again [12] ). The naturalness of the axiom set gives a successful description or fit to Kripke's original semantical theory. (However Halbach and Horsten have recently argued that since the Kripkean theory is one of partial interpretation of aṪ-predicate, then this should be better performed in a partial logic which they do in [5] . KF was originally developed in a classical framework). In [2] Cantini develops a theory which he calls VF to try and axiomatise a Kripkean approach using supervaluations. He has also asked whether there is any axiomatisation possible for the stable truth set arising from Herzberger's theory. We are somewhat doubtful of the possibilities for this here, deriving this in part from the strength of the statement that any revision sequence stabilizes (this requires a not insubstantial piece of second order number theory to establish), and in part from the reflecting properties of the particular level of the Gödel hierarchy where the stability set occurs.
However a second means to try and understand the various semantical approaches is through the medium of games, meaning the notion of two person perfect information (Gale-Stewart) games. These games are a familiar tool to descriptive set theorists. Martin has shown ( [11] ) how to illuminatingly represent the Strong Kleene fixed point over a countable model as the set of sentences for which a player has a strategy in an open game. He shows:
The Kleenean Fixed Point Game (Martin) There is a game G ϕ for the least fixed point T ∞ = (T + ∞ , T − ∞ ) of the strong Kleenean scheme so that Player I has a winning strategy in G ϕ if and only if ϕ ∈ T + ∞ ; Player II has a winning strategy if and only ϕ ∈ T − ∞ ; such winning strategies, if they exist, result in games of finite length; if neither player has a winning strategy, then, ϕ / ∈ T + ∞ ∪ T − ∞ , and play may continue for infinitely many steps; neither player wins the game and thus it can be declared a draw.
The appeal of these games is partly that the moves in the game reflect the compositionality inherent in the Strong Kleene Truth Tables and hence ultimately in the fixed points that arise. They thus allow a new epistemological slant on the semantically defined fixed point.
The task here is to provide games for the supervaluational fixed point theory (with which we shall assume the reader familiar -for which see [12] ), but principally for the stable theory of a Herzberger sequence (whose definition we do give below).
We have not seen a similar account of a game devised specially for supervaluation fixed points -although such is certainly possible on general grounds, as the least supervaluational fixed point over N, is a complete
1 -set, and such are representable by an open game formula (by a result of Svenonius for M = N, and by Moschovakis [13] for more general countable acceptable structures). Such games may well be known to others. They can not be expected to be "compositional" in the same way as for Strong Kleene, given the non-compositional nature of the supervaluation process. The formulation of the game here is thus more redolent of this process which involves looking at all possible 'completions' of the theory's extension built so far.
In the third section, we give a game, G sv ϕ , mirroring the statement above for Martin's game in terms of players' winning strategies and sentences in the fixed point. A variation on this game is shown to give a similar characterisation of the grounded dependency fixed point of Leitgeb. In Section 4 we address the main problem here of providing a game representation of the Herzberger stability set. Such games can no longer be represented as open games, (where winning runs of play for either of the players is given by an ∃ formula, or Σ 0 1 in the arithmetical hierarchy if we are considering M as the standard model of arithmetic); we discuss the matter further there, but on general grounds the payoff sets for such games can not be even ∃∀, although they are ∃∀∃. In terms of the usual Levy hierarchy of first order formulae, these are thus best possible results.
Briefly, Solovay (unpublished by him, but see [9] ) showed that winning stategies for all Σ 0 2 games occur at a level of the Gödel constructible hierarchy of constructible L-rank much less than ζ, the first repeat point of the Herzberger sequence, that is where T ζ = T ∞ . If we were able to find Σ 0 2 games to represent the Herzberger stability set T ζ , then that set could be found at a constructible level much lower than ζ. This is impossible as the Herzbergerian T ζ only appears first in L ζ+1 . On the other hand [14] shows that there are levels of the L hierarchy beyond ζ whose truth sets can be represented using Σ 0 3 games. It thus has to be at this level of Σ 0 3 payoff sets that one should look for suitable representing games. Unlike the other games discussed here, play is not effectively over after a finite number of moves if one of the players has a winning strategy: play must in general continue for infinitely many moves whether there is a winner or it is a draw. We have then a further way of looking at, or measuring, the size/complexity of the most basic sequence, the null sequence of the Herzbergerian revision theory: it is at the level of that of determinacy of Σ 0 3 games. That is lucky: determinacy for such games is at least provable in second order number theory. Had it been Σ 0 4 then such determinacy is not provable in full second order number theory (by results of Friedman ([4] ) and Martin).
The final section makes some remarks about the possibility of finding open game representations of T ζ in a logic with generalised quantifiers, which, speculatively, could be germane to an axiomatisation of the Herzberger theory.
The Kleenean Fixed Point Game
Given a first order structure M with a suitable first order language L M , we may extend the language to L + to contain a predicate symbolṪ. We shall assume that every element of the domain of M has a name in the language. In L + consider the least fixed point of the strong Kleene three valued logic built up from the empty extension forṪ:
We describe a game due to Martin that produces for a model M, a representation of those sets of sentences that are true or false in M with the fixed point partially interpretingṪ. Let ϕ be a sentence of the L + . Players I and II then make moves alternately either passing or listing sentences It is not hard to see that the rules conform to the Strong Kleene truth tables, and thus the game fulfils its task. Martin also points out some variations on the winning conditions have, that allow one to have a theory similar in spirit to Yablo's theory of [16] . The very simple nature of these games, reflecting as they do the structure of the logic makes a very attractive characterisation of this minimal fixed point. We shall see that even for the least supervaluational fixed point, although the complexity of such (in analytical terms) is the same as that for the Strong Kleene fixed point, the game itself requires a more substantial description.
The Supervaluational Fixed Point Game
Again let ϕ ∈ L + for some countable model M just as above.
There is a game G sv ϕ for the least fixed point T ∞ = (T + ∞ , T − ∞ ) of the supervaluational scheme so that Player I has a winning strategy in G sv ϕ if and only if ϕ ∈ T + ∞ ; Player II has a winning strategy if and only if ϕ ∈ T − ∞ ; such winning strategies, if they exist, result in games of finite length; if neither player has a winning strategy, then, ϕ / ∈ T + ∞ ∪ T − ∞ , and play may continue for infinitely many steps, and then the game is declared a draw).
We shall first define a simpler two person perfect information game G + ϕ played between Ulrich (Player I) and Agathe (Player II), moving in alternating rounds i k , m k . This game will provide one half of the above game G sv ϕ . (We thought it simpler, and less cluttered with notation, to slice the game up into two halves and prove the requisite Lemma 1 below for this; then the game G sv ϕ can be assembled from the game G + ϕ and an easily understood dual game G − ϕ .)
The idea is that Agathe has to be prepared to play a sequence Σ of sentences (m 0 = ¬ϕ, m 1 , . . .) of the language L + such that, if Ψ is the extension ofṪ so listed, (i.e. Ψ = { σ |∃im i =" σ ∈Ṫ" }) then Σ is the complete theory of M, Ψ .
We arrange this as follows: we think of the game as a series of queries by Ulrich as to whether σ is or is not in Σ that she is constructing (including the sentences as to whether " σ ∈Ṫ"); Agathe is giving yes or no answers to these queries, sometimes together with some additional information. During the course of the game Ulrich may issue a challenge to Agathe's earlier replies.
Round k: Player I, states "i k ". This can either be (i) a sentence σ, of L + , in which case Player II's reply is either "σ" or "¬σ" (meaning yes, "σ ∈ Σ" or, no, "¬σ ∈ Σ"); additionally, if σ is of the form "∃v 0 ψ(v 0 )" and she wishes to answer "yes", then she must also choose some constant b, and at the same time play "ψ[b]" as well as σ (so in this case m k stands in for this pair of sentences). If σ is an atomic sentence L M , then her answer must be consistent with facts of M. Thus if she answers no to "σ ∈ Σ" whilst σ is true in M, then she forfeits the game immediately. Player I may alternatively state a challenge to Player II. The challenges may come in one of two forms: either (A) he plays i k that is a code of a proof of a contradiction from a (finite) list m i 1 , . . . , m i l of sentences that II has already played in earlier rounds -thus demonstrating that II's list is inconsistent. His other form, (B) is that he may challenge an earlier assertion by II of the form " σ / ∈Ṫ ", or " σ ∈Ṫ " that she has made earlier. All of the above comprise the basic rules of the game G + ϕ . If anybody disobeys these rules, then the first to do so forfeits the game. If Player I issues a "consistency" challenge, then if he is correct, he wins outright and the game is over; however if he is incorrect Player II wins outright.
If Player I issues a challenge of type (B) to some earlier assertion by II of the form " σ / ∈Ṫ ", or " σ ∈Ṫ ", then play in G + ϕ is halted, and play starts afresh in G + σ (or in G + ¬σ if " σ ∈Ṫ " was the challenge). We can thus think of G + σ as a "subgame" of G + ϕ , but in any case it is defined from σ (or ¬σ) just as G + ϕ was defined from ϕ. Ulrich wins G + ϕ if and only if (i) II makes a mistake on the basic rules of the game (or any I-initiated subgame) at some stage, or (ii) he makes a successful challenge to the consistency of the sentences II is playing in G + ϕ or in the current subgame. Thus, for I to win, the overall game must be finite in length.
Note: II thus wins precisely when: a) I makes a false accusation that her list is inconsistent; or b) she manages to make infinitely many moves in G + ϕ or in any initiated subgame; or else c) through the whole course of play I initiates infinitely many subgames.
Lemma 1 I has a winning strategy in G
(we'll say that "rk(ϕ) = α 0 "). Considering II, she must play out a consistent Σ = Σ(ϕ), and Ψ = Ψ(ϕ) ⊂ Σ, an included extension forṪ, so that M, Ψ |= Σ. Additionally, as an example, if ϕ is of the form ∃v 0 ψ(v 0 ) then for every constant b in L + , she must ensure M, Ψ |= ¬ψ [b] . In every case, if she is to try and win, Ψ cannot be compatible with (T + (i) For some
As part of his strategy, I makes sure that he asks every query of the form "τ ∈Ṫ" during his course of play. (Indeed I can ensure the completeness of the pertinent Σ of any infinite run of any subgame, by asking every possible sentence query. This querying by I is not an essential feature of the game: we could have varied the basic rules and simply required II to answer queries from a priorly fixed enumeration of all sentences.) At some point then, when queried on ?σ 1 ∈Ṫ?, if Case (i) (or Case (ii) respectively) holds, II states " σ 1 / ∈Ṫ" (or " σ 1 ∈Ṫ" respectively). I on his next move calls a challenge to this statement, and the subgame G +
). In either case (with the obvious extension of notation) α 1 = df rk(σ 1 ) < α 0 , and the subgame now being initiated is being played on a formula of lower rank. The set Ψ(σ 1 ) (or Ψ(¬σ 1 )) that II now tries to play out is incompatible with (T +
∈ Ψ, and the resulting α 2 = df rk(σ 2 ) < α 1 . Proceeding in this way, as long as II does not lose through inconsistency, I eventually challenges with some σ k with rk(σ k ) = 0. However if σ k ∈ T (=⇒) Suppose ϕ / ∈ T + ∞ . We describe how Agathe can win. By hypothesis there is Ψ = Ψ(ϕ) and with Ψ ⊇ T + ∞ , Ψ ∩ T − ∞ = ∅, with M,Ψ |= ¬ϕ. Whenever she is queried Agathe consults the above model and gives the appropriate reply. She thus will not lose G + ϕ on consistency grounds, nor by breaking any other basic rule. If she is challenged on her assertion "σ 1 
, but as σ 1 / ∈ T + ∞ she is no worse off than before and can play just as well here using an appropriate Ψ = Ψ(σ 1 ), and the new model M,Ψ(σ 1 ) |= ¬σ 1 . If she is challenged on "σ 1 ∈Ṫ" then the subgame G ¬σ 1 is initiated; but ¬σ 1 / ∈ T + ∞ , and she can continue in the same way. Clearly she can keep this up no matter how many challenges that Ulrich issues, and she will ultimately win. QED For the full game G sv ϕ we double up the roles we have described: now both players must produce sequence of sentences Σ(I), Ψ(I) and Σ(II), Ψ(II) with I now trying to ensure the truth of ϕ in M,Ψ(I) and II as before its falsity in M,Ψ(II) . II now can also make appropriate queries of I's sentence moves. If neither have a winning strategy, then this is because ϕ / ∈ T + ∞ ∪ T − ∞ , and we have the above properties of the full game.
A Dependency Game
We now describe the variant of the game which characterises Leitgeb's (dependency) grounded sentences Φ ∞ = α<ω ck 1 Φ α (We give a very brief review of this notion here but refer the reader to Leitgeb [8] for a full description). Here we set D(Ψ) to be the set of sentences that depend on Ψ, where ϕ depends on
It is shown that D is a monotone operator, and hence we may define by induction Φ 0 = ∅, Φ α+1 = D(Φ α ), and taking unions at limit λ to form Φ λ . The fixed point Φ ∞ (which is Φ ω ck 1 , for the standard model of arithmetic M = N, +, ×, 0, , . . . , and is a complete Π 1 1 set) is then the set of sentences whose truth value depends on non-semantic states of affairs.
The similarity to the notion of supervaluation scheme is apparent and so we may form a similar game for sentences ϕ appropriate for M. G * ϕ is played in a similar fashion, Agathe must produce two extensions Ψ 0 , Ψ 1 and sets of sentences Σ 0 , Σ 1 (say she attends to queries about Ψ 0 , Σ 0 in even numbered rounds, and to Ψ 1 , Σ 1 on odd numbered ones). She is trying to ensure that M,Ψ 0 |= ¬ϕ whilst M,Ψ 1 |= ϕ. Thus when queried about ϕ must answer accordingly. The basic rules are the same mutatis mutandis and I may still challenge on grounds of consistency, with the same outcomes. If however II has earlier asserted "σ ∈ Ψ 0 " and "σ / ∈ Ψ 1 " (or vice versa) then I may issue a challenge, and the subgame G * σ is initiated (again the subgame is the same as the game: she tries to produce two extensions Ψ 0 (σ), Ψ 1 (σ) with M,Ψ 0 (σ) |= ¬σ, whilst M,Ψ 1 (σ) |= σ). As before, if neither player messes up their basic rules, then if the overall game lasts for infinitely many stages II wins.
Lemma 2 I has a winning strategy in G
Hence if II is trying to produce such Ψ 0 , Ψ 1 for some σ 1 ∈ Φ α she must answer "σ 1 / ∈ Ψ 0 " and "σ 1 ∈ Ψ 1 " (or vice versa) when queried by Ulrich, and the latter may now issue a challenge and the game proceeds to the subgame G * σ 1 . Now of course α 1 = df rk * (σ 1 ) < α 0 , and if no one messes up their basic rules, we arrive as before at the situation of playing in G * σ k where rk * (σ k ) = 0. But here, as Φ 0 = ∅, for every Ψ, Ψ , M,Ψ |= σ k ←→ M,Ψ |= σ k and so Agathe will lose at this point.
She may then play out the complete theories of the two models M,Ψ 0 , M,Ψ 1 . If she is challenged at some point on her assertions amounting to σ ∈ Ψ 0 \Ψ 1 , then even when the subgame G * σ is initiated we have σ / ∈ Φ ∞ and she is no worse off than before, and can continue in the same fashion using some Ψ 2 with M,Ψ 2 |= σ ←→ M,Ψ 2 ∩ Φ ∞ |= ¬σ. If in G * ϕ (or some initiated subgame) Ulrich makes no challenge, she can play out to the end without breaking any basic rule.
A game for Herzbergerian revision sequences
We now see how one can formulate a game for a Herzbergerian style revision sequence. We shall assume a further condition on our countable model M, that is it should be acceptable in the sense of Moschovakis (this seems to be needed in order for the proof of the technical lemma below to go through). Acceptability is a requirement that we can define over the structure M an appropriate coding scheme for finite sequences of elements from the domain of M. (We do not need these details here as we shall not be proving the Lemma.) Nothing will be lost if the reader keeps in mind the standard model N as M.
Let T α be the extension of the T-predicate at the α'th stage of a Herzberger Revision sequence starting out with T 0 = ∅ (recall, in brief, that we put σ into T α+1 if M,T α |= σ; we put σ ∈ T λ iff ∃α < λ∀β < λ(α < β −→ σ ∈ T β ) -Herzberger's "liminf" rule ). The revision semantics then discusses three kinds of sentences: those σ that are stably true (stably false) -meaning that ∃α∀β(α < β −→ σ ∈ T β ) ( ∃α∀β(α < β −→ σ / ∈ T β ) respectively) and those that are paradoxical namely ∀α∃β(α < β ∧ σ ∈ T β+1 \T β ). As is easily seen there is a "stability point", a countable ordinal ζ = ζ(M) so that σ ∈ T ζ ←→ σ ∈ T On that is, σ is in the revised extension at stage ζ iff σ is stably true; similarly at such a point we have ¬σ ∈ T ζ ←→ ¬σ ∈ T On , which expresses that σ is stably false iff ¬σ is in the extension T ζ . Thus the overall status of sentences in the revision sequence is mirrored precisely at stage T ζ . [1] identifies the ordinal ζ(N). From ζ onwards the whole process is cycling through a fixed sequence of extensions. The next ordinal where the extension T ζ reoccurs is called Σ = Σ(M). The game presentation relies on the following new technical result on such sequences:
The proof of this is technical and indirect, and thus is omitted here. In the sequel we let ≺ −, − : N × N ↔ N be any fixed recursive bijection. Using the above Lemma we can give the following:
The Stability Game There is a game G H ϕ for the least stability point T ∞ = T ζ of the Herzbergerian revision sequence starting out with T 0 = ∅ so that Player I has a winning strategy in G H ϕ if and only if ϕ ∈ T ∞ ; Player II has a winning strategy if and only if ϕ is stably false, that is when ¬ϕ ∈ T ∞ ; if neither player has a winning strategy, then ϕ is paradoxical, and then the game is declared a draw.
The (One-sided) Stability Game G H σ then is again one 'half' of the required game in which as above, for a sentence σ, I tries to show that σ is stably true. II tries simply to defeat this, without being obliged to demonstrate that σ is stably false. We describe then G H σ . Rules for Agathe II : She plays her moves (n 0 , n 1 , . . .) in order to code a revision sequence along a linear ordering in which σ is not stably true (thus either stably false or paradoxical).
The Basic Rules for II are: a) The even moves (n 2k ) must code a linear order: where we set a ≺ b ↔ ∃k(n 2k =≺ a, b ). It is required that ≺ be a discrete linear ordering, with end points o, s, and a further distinguished point z ∈ [o, s] ≺ . b) Using the odd round moves, (n 2k+1 ), she plays out complete sets T a ⊆ Sent ∩L to each a ∈ Field(≺). c) If t is the ≺-successor of t, then T t = Th( M,T t ); if t is a≺-limit, then T t = lim inf t ≺t T t . d) Both z, s are limit points of the ordering ≺; T z = T s and σ 0 / ∈ T z . Player I can make three kinds of moves. (i) m i may be a "Pass"; (ii) m i can be a 'query' move of the following specific form Q i (a, b, σ):
Rule of Committment e) for II: If m i is a query, then Player II must respond with n i+1 a "Yes" or a "No". Further, II must honour each such answer so made as a committment to her truth sets in the final revision sequence she builds along ≺.
• We shall think of the non-query, non-passing moves m k , as I's attempt to list an infinite descending chain through the underlying Field(≺) of Agathe's revision sequence. We shall allow him however infinitely many attempts at writing such a list, and so will organise such list-writing moves m l as making an entry on list L r , only when l is a power of the r'th prime p r . Rules for I: If m k is neither a pass nor a query, and p r | k, (thus m k is to be entered on list L r ) then ∃2k ≤ k(m k = n 2k =≺ a, b and if on the last round that some m l was played in L r , (if any), then m l =≺ b, c for some c ∈ Field(≺).
By this last move of m k I has simply adverted to the fact that on list L r , he has extended the list below b ≺ c with an element a with a ≺ b ≺ c.
Winning Conditions
I wins iff Either II breaks any of her rules, or ∃r[I makes infinitely many entries on list L r ].
The entry in square brackets in the second conjunct is an ∀∃ condition on the run of play. The second disjunct then adds an ∃∀∃ condition, to be a win for I. G H σ 0 is thus an ∃∀∃ game. ∈ T ∞ . Then in the "true revision sequence" of length Σ + 1, we see σ 0 / ∈ T ∞ = T Σ = T ζ . II ignores I and plays out a set of integers on her even moves coding a wellordering of length Σ + 1, and attaching to appropriate integers a in the field of that wellordering truth sets T a (where a is the rank of a in the wellorder) and obeying all the Basic Rules, answering I's questions truthfully, and so keeping, necessarily, to all committments. This way she wins: I can find no illfounded chains in ≺. Hence I can have no winning strategy.
(⇒) Suppose σ 0 ∈ T ∞ . Could II nevertheless have a way of playing G H σ 0 and winning? If so, let us suppose that she plays using a strategy τ. Then first note that her ordering ≺ cannot be a wellorder (because it would then in effect be a true revision sequence with a repeating pair of stability points, and we'd see " σ 0 ∈ T ∞ " in II's sequence -this would cause her to lose). So ≺ must be illfounded.
Let WFP(≺) denote the wellordered part of the linear ordering ≺ that II putatively plays out. Suppose β is the order type of (WFP(≺)), and in fact let us identify β with WFP(≺). Then: 1) Lim(β). And 2) s / ∈ WFP(≺)
as, for the same reason just mentioned, σ 0 / ∈ T s . A priori Ulrich has absolutely no idea what ordinal β ≤ Σ is being discussed. He only knows 1) and 2). However let us suppose that I makes the working assumption that a priorly fixed β truly is (isomorphic to) WFP(≺). We shall see how, if this were to be the case, that he could win. The method used relies on the following technical lemma:
This lemma in fact is the "non-wellfounded" version of the result about such revision sequences (which we shall not use directly in this argument) mentioned at the outset.
So, if we assume Lemma 5 proven, I additionally does know one more fact: he knows 3) that T s T β . He may therefore wait until Agathe reveals some υ ∈ T s \T β at some stage in time -which she must do sooner or later, as she must tell any basic fact about her sequence at some point. He is then in business. He starts making queries of the form Is s ≺ s and ∀t(s ≺ t ≺ s → υ ∈ T t ) ? Once he gets an affirmative answer to one such query (which again he must do, at some finite stage of the game, if υ ∈ T s and II obeys her basic rules -by the 'liminf' nature of T s ) then he knows s / ∈ WFP(≺). (Since s cannot be below β, for otherwise we'd have υ ∈ T β .) He could then make an m k listing move of the form ≺ s , s , and start off a descending ≺-chain.
However we can repeat this: as T s T β , by the Lemma, he can, by consulting T β again, wait until a similar situation as the one outlined above occurs again with a "Yes" committment, and another m k move can be made of the form ≺ s , s . Continuing in this way he can list an infinite ≺-descending chain.
The above discussion was based on the fiction that β is to be WFP(≺ ). So if this were to be the case, then I can defeat II. However, if now
is a (1-1) enumeration of the limit ordinals below Σ + 1, then we may let I make moves by listing entries on L r with the working assumption β = F(r) is the wellordered part of the ordering ≺ on rounds m k where p r | k. This way I plays using all possible working assumptions simultaneously. So if ≺ is not a wellorder, there will be at least one list on which he can win, thus defeating Agathe's strategy τ. Q.E.D.
The full game G H ϕ is the variant where I also is obliged to play out a linear ordering mirroring precisely the kind of moves II made, excepting that I's sequence must demonstrate that ϕ is in fact stable. Agathe is obliged in her sequence to show that ¬ϕ is stable. Simultaneously, as I did before, she has the opportunity to write countably many lists of potential descending chains through I's linear order. If ϕ is truly paradoxical then neither person has a winning strategy.
Remark 1 That I be allowed to draw up infinitely many independent lists can be shown to be necessary. It might be thought that there could be an equivalent variant of the game with I only drawing up a single list, and that the use of infinitely many lists was a symptom of our inability to design the right game (thereby squandering a quantifier). However there is no such game -for which see the next remark. In essence (but still a rough approximation) the relationship between the different truth sets T β for β < Σ is so complex that one cannot continuously define a single game with one list whilst still enforcing that II produce a wellordered sequence; one has to consider the "infinitely many games at once" device as above.
Remark 2
If we start with the standard model M = N then the complete runs of play of both players can be coded together as a sequence of integers y, and be classified within the arithmetical hierarchy. We then see that Rules a),b),d) on Agathe amount to a Π 0 2 condition on y. c) is (with some care) Π 0 3 . The payoff set of sequences for Ulrich is then a Σ 0 3 set. It is a non-trivial fact that there is no simpler game (for example, ∆ 0 3 ) for a Herzberger sequence. Thus in terms of the classificatory Levy hierarchy by formulae, the games G H σ here are already at the lowest possible level of complexity.
Conclusions
What do these games show us about the defined truth sets? For the simpler open games, and especially Martin's Strong Kleene game where the game directly follows the compositionality of the truth forming rules, the games give an alternative epistemological description of the truth sets that do not refer to 'ordinals', 'fixed points' and the like. A strategy for an open game that is over (at least for one player) in finitely many steps is something graspable (pace the fact that the strategy itself is nevertheless an infinite object). What of the strategies for the games involve in the stability game? These, as we have remarked, are necessarily of infinite length, and must have runs of play in prescribed Σ 0 3 sets. Indeed their complexity reflects the complexity of the stable truth sets, and indeed of the whole enterprise of the revision theory of truth. However, we may draw something from this representation via descriptive set theory. The quasi-inductive notion that is implicit in the Herzberger revision sequence (and which Burgess made explicit in [1] ) yields a notion of sets of integers forming a Spector class and we may apply a very general theorem due to Harrington, see [9] , that represent such classes of integers using open games (and thus over in a finite time for Player I if he has the winning strategy). These, however, are not in the usual first order logic, but in such augmented with non-standard quantifiers. When one inspects the quantifiers the theorem gives for a general Spector class, on this particular case, one sees that the quantifier would 'measure' gödel numbers of sets of sentences in terms of the prewellordering ≺ of their 'settling down' or 'becoming stable'. What that indicates is that: a) one can have an open, and so 'Σ 0 1 ', game formula representation of the stability set, albeit in terms of a logic of non-standard quantifiers; and further suggests b) the possibility of axiomatising the stable theory of truth, perhaps not well in a language L + M containing aṪ symbol for truth alone, but in a language augmented with a predicate symbol incorporating somehow the notion of ≺. Whether there is any meaningful modality that corresponds to ≺ remains to be seen, but there are points of contact. As remarked in the conclusion of [15] the revision theoretic machinery gives an interpretation to T( ϕ ) ∧ ϕ as something of the form 'having been true and true at this stage now'. Similarly Field's idea of a hierarchy of 'determinately true operators' (at least in the specific model given in [3] ) also has something of this in its construction -although perhaps not in its intended interpretation -of his → operator.
